Homegrown Napoleon

BRIAN: You’re listening to BackStory. We’ll be back in a minute.

We’re back with BackStory, they show that takes a contemporary topic and considers its roots through three centuries of American history. I’m Brian Balogh, and I get to speak for the 20th century.

ED: I’m Ed Ayers, representing the 19th century.

PETER: And I’m Peter Onuf, standing in for the 18th century.

We’re talking today about fears of executive overreach through the centuries. We’re looking at a few times when the president has been seen to skew the balance of power among the three branches in his favor.

BRIAN: Ed, Peter we’re talking about the extension of executive power, so I order you both to leave.

[LAUGHTER]

So I can take over–

PETER: All right, Boss!

BRIAN: The microphone. And here’s what I would say if you guys left.

ED: I want to vote on it, Peter. Let’s have democracy.

PETER: Well, I’d say each microphone has got equal power in this division of power.

[LAUGHTER]

BRIAN: Here’s what I’d say if I were able to order you out of the room. I would say, this is a no-brainer. The reason that throughout the 20th century presidents are charged with executive overreach, especially after World War II, is they have a lot more power. And the reason they have a lot more power is the American people want them to have a lot more power. And the reason the American people want them to have a lot more power is they don’t want to get blown up in their sleep. They don’t want to get exposed to contagious diseases and things. I’m sorry. I don’t want to pull the 20th century thing on you, but things move faster.

Let’s just take one example that no one argues about. Nobody disputes that if we are attacked with nuclear weapons, the president makes the decision. He makes it within 10 minutes, and nobody ever says, oh, that’s executive overreach. We really should consult with Congress on that. We should have a deliberative democracy. What about the three branches–

PETER: Ooh, the three branches.

BRIAN: Of government with these incoming nuclear missiles.

[LAUGHTER]

What would the Supreme Court? And that is a pure function of history, technology, the speed at which things move today. End of conversation.

PETER: No, Brian.

[LAUGHTER]

I’m afraid you’re all wrong.

[LAUGHTER]

This idea of an all-powerful executive that’s got the future of the world– well, they didn’t have nuclear wars in the 18th century– I’ll grant you that much. There are no buttons to push.

BRIAN: I’m glad I pushed your button, Peter.

PETER: You did push my button. The fundamental need for security has shaped attitudes towards executive power from the very beginning, from before the beginning in American history. The reason there is a revolution– get this down– is that the king, who was supposed to–

BRIAN: I have my quill.

PETER: Yeah, you got it?

BRIAN: I have my quill.

PETER: The king is supposed to protect his subjects. You owe allegiance to the king. That you might call a protection covenant. I give my allegiance, my loyalty, to you because you protect me. Americans were protected in the colonial period by the enormous power of the British state on the seas and in land wars. It’s George III’s alleged betrayal of that trust, of that executive responsibility, that leads to the Revolution. It’s a revolution against executive authority, but it’s on behalf of a conception of empire of the United States that depends on executive authority.

Because the first thing to keep in mind is you’ve got to make a war in order to win your independence. That war is the ultimate exercise of executive authority. And guess who’s in charge of this thing? It is gorgeous George Washington, and he becomes the Republican equivalent of a king.

If you want my version of American history, it is Americans have always wanted it both ways. They want what only an executive can give, and that is protection. And then they want liberty. They want rights, which is immunity from the power of that executive.

ED: So let me make sure I understand this. So Brian, you’re saying that, of course, we need a stronger and stronger executive because there’s more and more things to execute, that the machinery is bigger and faster.

BRIAN: Well said.

ED: Peter’s saying, oh come on. It’s always built in. Its there from the beginning. We’re fundamentally ambivalent about this. We want Dad, and we don’t want Dad. And it’s funny that you could both be equally wrong.

[LAUGHTER]

Because let’s think about it. Let’s do a quick quiz. What president had, by far, the greatest share of the power that the government had in toto?

BRIAN: It has to be Abraham Lincoln. You didn’t jump into the breach.

[LAUGHTER]

ED: So I will answer the question for you.

BRIAN: Even I would agree that’s right for a moment in time.

ED: Well, exactly, because it’s the greatest crisis that the nation’s faced as you were saying, Brian. And as you’re saying, Peter, is that we are looking to Dad when things are falling apart, and things never fell apart as much as in the great Civil War.

But here’s the thing about Abraham Lincoln that complicates this. One, he met determined opposition from the moment he became president until the day he was assassinated. And by opposition, I don’t just mean the Confederates, I mean in his own nation, the United States. The amazing thing is Lincoln won 45% of the vote in 1860, and he won 45% of the vote in 1864, after all of the great accomplishments of the Civil War, including the Gettysburg Address, the fall of Atlanta, the fall of Shenandoah Valley. He could still not persuade half the population. And they said the hardest things about him that have ever been said about any president.

So it suggests that he’s both exercising all of this tyrannical power, winning this war, and at the same time there’s still a crisis of legitimacy attached to somebody who would exert that much power. And he was criticized mainly for usurping too much power.

The other thing that complicates Lincoln as the answer to all questions associated with this, unfortunately, is that that power receded with remarkable speed after Lincoln. And for the next 1/2 century, we have a long series of the weakest presidents in American history. So Brian, help me. Where do we go from there then?

BRIAN: We go back to what you said originally, Ed, which is that Lincoln was truly exceptional. The biggest disjuncture between presidential power and the norm that was accepted about presidential power before the war and before Lincoln assumed these extraordinary powers.

Let’s compare him, for instance, to FDR, Franklin D. Roosevelt, generally seen as a very powerful president. But if we return, if you were paying attention, Ed, to what I said at the beginning of this conversation, the 20th century is different because the State is growing, because things need to be done quickly, because there isn’t time for deliberation. FDR is not seen– notice I didn’t argue with you– FDR is not seen as the president with the most extraordinary powers. So even though he deals with the crisis of the Great Depression, even though he deals with World War II, he does not receive the kind of criticism during those crises that Lincoln does because he is not as out of step with his times as Abraham Lincoln was.

ED: He actually builds his electoral coalition over time.

BRIAN: Exactly.

ED: It becomes stronger, deeper, and wider.

BRIAN: And when does he get in trouble? He gets in trouble when the crisis subsides. He gets in trouble in ’38 when people are feeling a little more secure economically. He gets in trouble as the war comes to the end, as people begin to wonder about his negotiating with Stalin and the deal at Yalta, when the war is over, when they’re feeling a little safer. So I think that, Ed, unwittingly of course, you really put your finger on things. The Civil War and Abraham Lincoln, the combination of the two, were really exceptional.

I concede that when it comes to executive power in the 20th century, it’s really a more mundane story.

ED: It’s routinized.

BRIAN: Its routinized. FDR builds this machinery of the bureaucracy. It stays there.

PETER: But those fears of tyrannical power in the executive do resurface.

BRIAN: They do.

PETER: And it’s precisely because of doubts, pervasive doubts, about this existential crisis, and about the fact that the United States is at risk and the people are at risk.

BRIAN: I agree, Peter. But I would say, at least in the 20th century, they tend to resurface when we’re feeling pretty cool.

PETER: Right, I agree.

BRIAN: When we’re feeling pretty safe.

ED: We can afford to be paranoid.

[LAUGHING]

BRIAN: That’s exactly right, and we can afford to worry about Daddy throwing his weight around.

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