"Thousands gather at the Subtreasury Building on Wall Street during Armistice Day, 1918." Source: New York Times via Wikimedia Commons

The War to End All Wars

Remembering WWI

10.26.18

On November 11, 1918, Germany formally surrendered to the Allied Powers, about 19 months after the United States entered the conflict. On this episode, Brian and Nathan reflect on how, 100 years later, “the war to end all wars” is still with Americans.

World War I

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A Purple Heart, 100 Years Later

Perry James, grandson of World War I veteran Sergeant Perry Lloyd, tells Nathan about his mission to get his grandfather a Purple Heart, what it means to finally realize it and the importance of remembering the service of African-American soldiers in World War I.

African American soldiers; World War I; World War I veterans; commemoration

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Nathan Connolly: Major funding for Back Story is provided by an anonymous donor, The National Endowment for the Humanities, the University of Virginia, and The Robert and Joseph Cornell Memorial Foundation.

Nathan Connolly: From Virginia Humanities, this is Back Story.

Nathan Connolly: Welcome to Back Story, the show that explains the history behind today’s headlines. I’m Nathan Connolly.

Brian Balogh: And I’m Brian Balogh. If you’re new to the podcast, Nathan, Ed Ayers, Joanne Freeman and I are all historians. Each week we explore the history of one topic that’s been in the news.

Nathan Connolly: Today we’re going to start off in Charleston, South Carolina, where a Purple Heart was just awarded to a World War I veteran for his historic service 100 years ago.

Perry James: It was absolutely great. I get kind of emotional, particularly when something that’s near and dear to my heart is undertaken, so I got a little teary-eyed.

Nathan Connolly: That was Perry James, grandson of World War I veteran and Purple Heart winner, Sergeant Perry Lloyd.

Perry James: And after I was finished I wished I’d said that soldiers don’t cry, soldiers don’t cry, but then I realized I was a sailor. And they do cry. But in all seriousness, I tend to take life with the glass half full, and I don’t fault anybody for my grandfather not getting the recognition. I’m grateful to be in the position to do the research and to give back to the community and to receive such a wonderful honor on behalf of my grandfather. And my mother, she was sitting there, she’s 88 years old, her name is Elise James, Elise Lloyd James. And when we first found out about my grandfather’s wound, she had forgotten about it a little bit, and she said, “Yeah, I do remember him saying that he was wounded about the head.” And she said, “Well Perry, I just want you to get me his Purple Heart. And you just really don’t tell Elise Lloyd James no.

Nathan Connolly: That’s what sent you on your mission.

Perry James: Oh, absolutely. I was on my mission. And when we got the actual email I was at her house, got the email that my grandfather had been awarded the purple heart, you could have thought we won that one billion dollar lottery that’s out there.

Nathan Connolly: Wow. Now you ended up going to France to retrace your grandfather’s steps.

Perry James: Absolutely.

Nathan Connolly: What was that like?

Perry James: Oh, there’s a big smile that comes on my face every time I think about it. I’m thanking all the lucky stars that I had this opportunity to go over, because it afforded me a chance to actually go to the site in France where my grandfather had been wounded a hundred years to the day.

Nathan Connolly: Wow.

Perry James: So if you can imagine being out on a tall hill surrounded by vast amounts of land, and look at a monument there that is dedicated to the African American soldiers that lost their lives, and to look at that moment and see the name of a gentleman by the name of William Lang. Before I went over I found out that Mr. Lang grew up actually a half a mile from where I grew up. So there was a real connection to witness the name of someone on the monument, to note that they were killed and to just think that your grandfather’s name could have been on that monument, it is a surreal, real moment.

Nathan Connolly: So I have to ask you. This experience of going all the way to France and finding a monument commemorating the 371st, what do you feel when you see that, especially when you think about the struggle it takes to commemorate African-American veterans in the United States?

Perry James: It’s disappointing and disheartening. Because of my awareness now, particularly of my grandfather and the other men in the 371st colored infantry regiment, it’s a big part of our history that’s missing. And in this world of tension between the races, it’s just a great opportunity to share with other Americans, particularly white Americans who sometimes don’t even know that African Americans fought in the great war, and fought gallantly, and were brave soldiers. So it’s disheartening, however I have to realize that’s the country that I was born in, this is the country that I served in the military of, and a lot of my other family members, you just have to go about and tell as many people as you can. And that’s my mission. In a general conversation I just can’t help but tell somebody, “Hey, do you know that,” or, “Let me tell you that my grandfather was a World War I veteran who earned the Purple Heart, and who made Sergeant in four months.”

Nathan Connolly: As we sit here in 2018-2019 and look back on World War I, what should we remember about the great war, and what do you think we should remember about African American’s role in it in particular?

Perry James: Well, I think part of it is to recognize that the turn of the century was a time when civil rights actually gained a little momentum, because leaders like W.E.B. DuBois and other notable leaders in the African American community were very disappointed that there was not any space in the United States Army for African Americans to go to combat. Traditionally the only thing African American soldiers could do back then was labor intensive jobs, like unload freight cars, cook the meals, dig graves and bury the dead. The African American community at the turn of the century felt that through combat, African American men could show their metal, they could show their dedication to the United States, and they could show their willingness to serve in hopes of gaining respect in the white community. And initially there was not going to be any African American combat troops, but because of the protest launched by these early civil rights leaders, the federal government decided that yeah, okay, we’ll allot for four African American at the time colored regiments.

Nathan Connolly: Just thinking about all the ways in which the local politics of race played out in the military really makes the service itself seem that much more heroic.

Perry James: Absolutely it does. And I can only imagine my grandfather and his troops fighting for a country that saw them as not even citizens, not even second class citizens. And who if when they came back home, if these African Americans wore their uniforms they would be lynched or beaten up. And mind you, that’s a uniform that you were fighting in, and you got shot, and you spilled your blood, but you can’t wear that uniform when you come back home. So it was a distressing feeling for them.

Perry James: The group that my grandfather was in was nicknamed The Red Hands, and they were nicknamed that because of all the German blood that was shed by those hands. So they were pretty geeked up-

Nathan Connolly: Formidable.

Perry James: Yeah, they were all formidable, but that patch was a symbol of accomplishment. A symbol of their manhood. And the army did not want them to come back to the United States confident and cocky for lack of a better term. So they actually made them strip the Red Hand patch off of their clothing before they boarded the transport ship back to the United States. I’m a reinacter, I wear my grandfather’s uniform, and I wear his Red Hand patch proudly today.

Like a Virgin

Historian Nancy Bristow tells Brian about one of the biggest worries about sending young Americans off to war: whether they would be having sex — and how that preoccupation helped end the Progressive movement.

Progressive Era; World War I; sexually transmitted infections

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Nathan Connolly: The great war decimated Europe and left millions of casualties including over 100,000 American soldiers. A century ago this month the bloodshed finally ended with the signing of the Armistice. Today we look at the legacy of World War I and the ways in which the war is still with us a hundred years later.

Nathan Connolly: We’ll be looking at how America raced to build the largest chemical weapons program in the world, the rise of the surveillance state, and how Woodrow Wilson tried to recreate the world in America’s image.

Nathan Connolly: But first, as the United States mobilized for war in 1917, Americans began to fear for their young soldiers. Besides all the obvious fears of battle, they were also terrified of soldiers getting venereal disease, and they had reason to worry. In the days before penicillin, VD could decommission a lot of soldiers. To head off the threat, President Wilson and a coalition of progressive reformers set up the committee on training camp activities. In 2014 I spoke to historian Nancy Bristow, about this group of performers and their different ideas of how to stop the scourge of venereal disease?

Nancy Bristow: I would describe sort of three wings here. You’ve got people concerned with purity, people concerned with social justice, and people concerned with efficiency. So the period reformers are going to want to provide opportunities for people to have safe, clean, helpful interactions, men and women together, to be good, middle class Americans who have self control and manage their bodies through sexual abstinence, at least until marriage. And they’re going to do things like posting picnics, and having town parades, and those things aren’t going to have much impact and will become less and less important to the federal government as the war goes on. Then you’re going to have social justice reformers who may be trying to manage the situation in a pretty complicated way to provide opportunities for girls to find a route that is meaningful to them away from prostitution, away from simply being exploited for sex during the war. But the efficiency reformers, when push comes to shove, are going to be most interested in keeping the soldiers free of disease, and the commission on training camp activities, the federal agency that’s actually created to oversee these issues during the war. The CTCA is really most of all concerned with efficiency, and here you can think of any number of urban governments that are set up in this time to run things in a more democratic but also more efficient manner.

Brian Balogh: Right.

Nancy Bristow: These folks, when it comes to VD, are wanting to hand out condoms.

Nathan Connolly: They want to cut to the chase.

Nancy Bristow: They want to cut to the chase and that’s really where the federal government comes down, is that they really want virile yet virginal soldiers as the historian Allan Brandt describes it, but they’re willing to have a backup plan.

Brian Balogh: So it sounds to me like virile trumped virginal.

Nancy Bristow: Yes. They’re going to be willing to use law enforcement programs, and they’re going to use them pretty repressively for young women. Part of what happens as they begin a more law enforcement directed program to prevent venereal disease is they begin to arrest women on the street, and they arrest them for a range of behaviors. They need not actually be engaging in anything that resembles a sexual act, in fact they can be at a dance and dance incorrectly, and once you are arrested you are taken to a hospital or to some sort of medical clinic where you’re tested for venereal disease. If you have it, you are then locked up in a hospital until you’re cured. In a pre-penicillin world this could take months and months and months. You might never be cured. Once you’re cured, you are then prosecuted for your crime, and then once you’re prosecuted you are held in a reformatory, often on what was called an indeterminate sentence. So for all the talk of social justice reformers, about moving to a world where men and women were treated the same, where both would become advocates of purity in American life, the reality is that both this commission and the American populous, and I suppose I should add a third population, the American soldiers, they don’t buy it by and large. Boys will be boys, men will be men, but women are to be the moral bastions of the American culture.

Brian Balogh: This coalition is easy to make fun of, but they did have some very idealistic hopes. Did the coalition hold together after the war? Were any of these objectives pursued in the 1920s, and were the actors the same?

Nancy Bristow: Historians have long said that World War I brought the end of the progressive movement. I would actually frame it just a little bit differently and say that the war actually empowered progressives, and created coalitions that perhaps were a little bit tenuous all along. And so suddenly you have people who before had been able to imagine themselves having a coalition, okay, we’ll work together on this because we all agree that venereal disease is a serious problem in American life. They could hold together tenuously until there’s actual real power to hand around, until you actually begin to repress American women and lock them up. Until you begin to distribute condoms, and then they begin to really recognize the differences that they have. And in the aftermath of the war, the progressive coalition in general is coming apart at the scenes, even as Americans are just fed up with federal intervention in their lives, we go from an all for one and one for all to individualism, it’s up to you to make your own way, let’s not have a social safety net, let’s not be preoccupied with community.

Brian Balogh: Nancy Bristow is professor of history at the university of Puget Sound. She’s the author of Making Men Moral: Social Engineering During the Great War.

D.C.’s Death Valley

Theo Emery, journalist and author of Hellfire Boys, explores America’s race to develop chemical weapons during World War I at American University and the ethical questions raised by such gruesome warfare. And how, a hundred years later, we’re still reckoning with its consequences.

Smolder by Podington Bear

World War I; chemical/biological weapons

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Nathan Connolly: During World War I, soldiers were stuck in the trenches for months on end. So for the first time, combatants turned to chemical weapons to push ahead and break through the stalemate. And by the end of the war, the US capacity for chemical warfare had surpassed all of its allies in the span of just 18 months. Journalist Theo Emery tells us how it happened.

Theo Emery: Well, there were centuries of treaties that governed laws of war in Europe, and gas warfare had actually been a part of those treaties and those negotiations for a very long time. There was actually a treaty in 1675, the Strasbourg Agreement between France and Germany which prohibited the use of poison bullets. More recently than that there was also the Brussels Agreement in 1876, and the Hague Convention’s 1899 and in 1907 that forbid the use of asphyxiating gasses in shells. So there was a pretty clear, when the Germans used chemical weapons, I guess you could say successfully, for the first time in April of 1915 it was definitely seen as a violation of international law, both the letter of the law as well as the spirit of the law. And there was an immediate very strong reaction on the part of newspaper editorials all across the world, a great deal of outcry over this, and yet all of the combatants then went forward with their own chemical weapons programs.

Nathan Connolly: So Theo, give me some sense of what life was like at American University in these testing facilities.

Theo Emery: Sure. I have to say, it was a very grim existence for these men. It was very dangerous, it was a lot of uncertainty about what kinds of substances they were handling, there was a constant danger of injury, and injuries were actually quite common. They were actually required as well to participate in what were called man tests, and sometimes these were tests where they would put on a gas mask and test how well it was working, but some of the tests also included things like rolling up their sleeve and having different new kinds of chemical agents dropped on their skin to see what the impact would be, and there’s many photos in the National Archives of soldiers with their sleeves rolled up with these blisters on their skin where they’ve been tested with chemical agents.

Theo Emery: So it was very dangerous, kind of grim work. And around 1918 the chemical warfare service recognized that unless they made a little bit more of an effort to kind of improve life for these men, then morale was going to suffer. So they started a whole series of different things to try to frankly improve life for these soldiers and chemists, and so they started a newspaper for example, they started banjo clubs, they had a glee club, they had dances, they had a talent show, they had sports teams. They actually had a very successful football team called The Mustard Gassers, not surprisingly, who apparently beat most, if not all of the other army intermural football teams all around Washington DC. So there was this effort to kind of provide a slightly lighter recreation for the men who faced some really difficult work and very dangerous work on a day to day basis.

Nathan Connolly: Discuss Amos Fries. He found himself appointed chief to the Expeditionary Force Gas Service in the United States. What did he do to prepare for gas warfare?

Theo Emery: After expecting to be put in charge of the roads in France, he’s called into his superior officer’s office and said, “How would you like to be chief of the gas service in Europe?” And he thinks about it, and he says, “Well, somebody’s gotta be the goat, and it might as well be me,” and he accepts it and they hand him, the way he described it, was a thin manila folder which contained everything that the American Expeditionary Forces knew about gas warfare at that point. So he built this up essentially from nothing, mainly from learning from and piggybacking off of the efforts of the French, but especially the British and their efforts at establishing a chemical warfare arsenal and capacity.

Nathan Connolly: After the war, Amos Fries becomes a vocal advocate of chemical warfare. I’m curious about the kinds of arguments he made in favor of using those weapons.

Theo Emery: So on the one hand Fries took the view that chemical warfare was more humane than conventional weapons, and that argument came out of data that was collected by the War Department, that showed that while many soldiers were injured by chemical weapons, very few of them died from them. So to Fries and like minded advocates of chemical weapons, this meant that it took soldiers off the battlefield without killing them or maiming them permanently. So therefore it was a more humane weapon because you weren’t, say disfigured or for that matter, dismembered by something like high explosives or a machine gun. On the other hand, he also made an argument, sometimes in the same breath, that chemical weapons were necessary because you needed to make war so horrible, just so awful that no one would ever want to fight them again. So these are sort of the early seeds of strategic deterrence, which became, you know, a huge factor in the 20th century with nuclear weapons. So he took the view that warfare just, the chemical weapons would make war so awful that no one would want to fight it.

Theo Emery: So he would say these things almost in the same breath. You know, they’re more humane, and at the same time they made the battlefield so awful that no one would even want to go to war. Full of contradictions.

Nathan Connolly: So, I’m really curious to know how America’s experience of developing chemical weapons might have served as a precursor for the Manhattan Project, or even for what Eisenhower would later describe as the dangers of the military industrial complex.

Theo Emery: Well, that’s one of the reasons why I think this history is so important, because in a lot of ways it’s not some kind of atavistic fact of the past, in many ways it’s actually still with us today in ways that I think aren’t that obvious and should be understood a little bit better. So one of them is the fact that, the idea of deterrence, that everyone has to have a weapon in order to prevent anyone from using that weapon is an idea that did not begin with nuclear weapons after World War II, it began with chemical weapons in World War I. So this policy of deterrence, which kind of undergirded, it was sort of the spine of the 20th century and the cold war, is something that came directly out of World War I. Which I think a lot of people have forgotten. But also, a little bit more concretely than that, you’re right, many historians consider the very rapid creation of the chemical warfare service as kind of a precursor, a dry run really, for the Manhattan Project in World War II.

Theo Emery: In fact some of the same people were actually involved with both. The young chemist who was in charge of the plant in Willoughby, Ohio making lewisite was James Bryant Conant, who went on to become president of Harvard, and then became a key figure in the Manhattan Project, and that’s true of other very well known physicists and other scientists who also worked on chemical warfare in World War I and participated in, or assisted with the Manhattan Project in World War II. So I think that’s a real legacy as well.

Nathan Connolly: Take us back to the beginning of the story, where the development of chemical weapons in the United States at American University jumps off. And tell me what happened at American University after World War I, and particularly in the area of DC where the campus was located.

Theo Emery: You know, by the end of the war, American University was almost like a toxic boom town with almost 2,000 soldiers and scientists there. Now, by mid-1918 the War Department had invested about a million dollars in American University in buildings, in an infrastructure, and the plan was that the War Department would either purchase American University or seize it by eminent domaine, along with all the land around the campus that they were using as a proving ground and a testing ground, and they would turn it into a permanent seat for chemical warfare research beyond the war.

Theo Emery: Now, that might well have come to pass, except for something that happened on August third of 1918. And on that morning there were some soldiers who were doing an experiment at an outdoor lewisite still on the American University campus and the pipes clogged, and there was an explosion, and a cloud of lewisite was released from this outdoor still. So it created this cloud that sort of floated roughly southwest across the campus and down a gully and enveloped a house that was just outside the barbed wire fence of the American University experiment station. Well it just so happened that a former US senator lived in that house, who’s a man named Nathan Bay Scott, and he was sitting on the porch with his wife and his sister-in-law when this gas cloud began sweeping toward them, and they got inside the house, but not before all three of them had been exposed to the gas. He wasn’t killed, all three of them had sort of minor injuries, but it became a huge scandal that this research station, inside the city limits of Washington could be so dangerous and that it could affect civilians, including one who was as prominent as Nathan Bay Scott.

Theo Emery: So this created a great deal of tension between the Chemical Warfare Service and the Core of Engineers as well as the commission which governed the city of Washington, and eventually the Chemical Warfare Service had to abandon this plan, and they said, “We’re going to close up the experiment station after the war and we’re going to turn it back over to American University, which is what they did.

Theo Emery: But, they left some things behind. They had shells that were leaking, there were items that they deemed too dangerous to move, so they buried them.

Nathan Connolly: Oh my gosh!

Theo Emery: Well over subsequent decades, all of this land was developed into a very posh neighborhood, it was called Spring Valley, and these were very, very large houses, mansions really, and this history of how this area and the campus was used for chemical warfare was essentially all but forgotten until the 1990s, and in 1993 during construction on a very sort of distant part of Spring Valley, and excavation crew dug up a mortar that had been buried since probably 1918, or early 1919, and this backhoe operator heard gas hissing out of this mortar shell, called the fire department or the police, and they called in the Army, and a state of emergency ensued, and a cleanup began which is actually continuing today, 25 years later.

Nathan Connolly: Oh my lord!

Theo Emery: A quarter of a century, Spring Valley is still being cleaned up from this work of 100 years ago.

Nathan Connolly: Theo Emery is a journalist, and the author of the book, Hellfire Boys: The Birth of the US Chemical Warfare Service and the Race for the World’s Deadliest Weapons.

Don’t Speak

Brian talks to historian Beverly Gage about socialist leader Eugene Debs, who was arrested for speaking out against the war in 1918.

All the Pretty Horses by Podington Bear
Long Walk by Ketsa

Espionage Act of 1917; Sedition Act of 1918; World War I

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Brian Balogh: Most Americans rallied around the war effort, but there was dissent as well, especially after Congress instituted the draft. Some three million eligible men refused to register, and there were large scale public protests against the war. President Wilson and Congress reacted by passing the Espionage Act of 1917, and the 1918 Sedition Act. In 2017 I spoke to Beverly Gage about how the Espionage and Sedition Acts repressed civil liberties in the wake of the war.

Beverly Gage: Those laws basically banned criticism of the war effort, criticism of the government, criticism conveniently of the president, and particularly criticism and disruption of the draft.

Brian Balogh: Thousands of Americans were arrested for speaking out against the war. Gage points out that the government wasn’t just stifling dissent. US officials were worried about German spies, especially after German saboteurs blew up a munitions depot in New York Harbor in 1916.

Beverly Gage: There were real concerns, but the question was how you were going to deal with those concerns, what the legal lines would be, what the cultural lines would be, and I think that, let’s just say, the United States did not always get that balance right.

Brian Balogh: Political radicals were the chief targets of the government crackdown. They included anarchists, socialists, and the members of left wing labor movements who all believed the conflict was-

Beverly Gage: Just a war of blood and treasure. It’s empires fighting each other. The working man should not be going to war.

Brian Balogh: Consider the case of Eugene Debs.

Beverly Gage: Eugene Debs really was the most famous socialist in the United States at this moment, and from the vantage point of the 21st Century that might not sound like much, but you actually had a huge and pretty widespread socialist movement in the United States at this point. A lot of that movement was centered in the Midwest. Debs himself was from Indiana, and so he was sort of the standard bearer of good, corn fed Midwestern American socialism.

Brian Balogh: Debs had run for president several times, first as a democrat, and then as a socialist candidate. In the 1912 election he won a million votes.

Beverly Gage: Even people who aren’t in the socialist party like to show up at Debs’ rallies to hear him speak. He’s this kind of famous charismatic figure, and anyone in the United States in 1917, if you said the name Eugene Debs, they would know who he was.

Brian Balogh: Debs didn’t buy Wilson’s rhetoric, that he was making the world safe for democracy, but in his anti-war speeches Debs had to choose his words very carefully.

Beverly Gage: Debs, like many political radicals then faces a question of his own, which is that he’s still pretty opposed to this war, he still thinks it’s a war for blood and treasure, a war that’s exploiting the working class, and he feels this deep in his soul, but he knows that he probably shouldn’t say everything that he is thinking. So a lot of his speeches during the war try to kind of strike that balance, and he said, you know, “I don’t believe that we should be drafting working men into the army, but I’m not going to go too far with that,” and so he really tries to strike a balance.

Brian Balogh: Right. And Debs runs afoul of that enhanced Espionage Act in June of 1918. Tell us what he does.

Beverly Gage: So Debs finally does get in trouble for a speech that he makes in Canton, Ohio in the spring of 1918, and again, he’s pretty careful about what he’s saying. He goes and visits some working men who are themselves in jail for various speech violations, for criticizing the war effort, and he comes out and says, and I’ll just read a little of his speech here. He says, “They have come to realize as many of us have that it is extremely dangerous to exercise the constitutional right of free speech in a country fighting to make democracy safe for the world. I realize in speaking to you this afternoon that there are certain limitations placed on the right of free speech,” so in the end he actually gets thrown in prison for a speech that is about how difficult it is to preserve the right of free speech in a time of war.

Brian Balogh: In a country that is fighting a war, to quote Debs, to preserve democracy.

Beverly Gage: That’s right. That’s one of the great contradictions of the first World War, is that Woodrow Wilson is going around the world saying we are the great champions of democracy, we’re fighting a war for democracy, but at home it’s really one of the most repressive periods in American history. So many thousands of Germans are put into internment camps, several thousand people who have spoken out against the war are prosecuted, and then there are a whole series of really pretty gruesome vigilante attacks against anti-war protestors, against German immigrants, that really give this period a flavor of repression and fear on the home front.

Brian Balogh: And how long is Debs jailed for when he’s convicted, jailed for defending free speech?

Beverly Gage: He’s given a pretty serious sentence of 10 years.

Brian Balogh: Wow!

Beverly Gage: And this is for nothing more than a speech really. And he appeals this, the case goes all the way up to the Supreme Court, and they say that seems fine, the Espionage Act is a fine law and we uphold it. One of the, I guess ironies of Debs’ jail sentence is that he ends up not going to prison until after the war is already over, and he only ends up spending a couple of years there, but they’re pretty significant years. So he runs for president in 1920 from federal prison, which is a pretty remarkable thing. There are these amazing photos of Debs sort of standing there in his prison uniform near his cell, trying to look very presidential. But he actually looks pretty old and defeated. He is not a young man at this point-

Brian Balogh: Was anybody yelling, “Lock him up?”

Beverly Gage: Well, it was a little late at that point, but they had been yelling it before.

Beverly Gage: After that, one of the good things that Warren Harding does is actually commute Eugene Debs’ sentence, so he’s let out of prison in December of 1921, so he spends about two and a half years there all together. And at the time his allies already saw him as a martyr, but many Americans thought this was a perfectly justifiable thing to have done, to have put someone who was a traitor to the country into prison. I think over time mainstream opinion started to shift on that, and the Supreme Court’s ideas about speech restrictions really began to change and you began to get a new, kind of more mainstream civil libertarian consensus starting to emerge.

Brian Balogh: Bev, if I could get you to step back, does fighting to preserve democracy around the world mean a threat to democracy at home in the United States?

Beverly Gage: I’m not sure I would put it quite so starkly, but I do think that World War I turned out to be a moment of contradictions and a moment of experimentation. So part of what is going on in the United States with things like the Espionage Act, or the German interment camps, or federal political surveillance that’s really beginning to emerge during this moment is that the government is trying to figure out what you do to fight this kind of war, and some of the things that it sets precedents for turn out to be very lasting things. You see both the creation of forms of federal political surveillance and the first federal intelligence agencies really getting to work in a significant way, but you also see the birth of a kind of reaction against that, and the best symbol of that is a new civil liberties consciousness that then takes form, first in something called the National Civil Liberties Bureau in 1917 that later goes on to be better known as the ACLU, and they really go on to have a huge influence in shaping how the courts are going to think about these questions, but also in shaping how ordinary Americans are going to think about civil liberties.

Beverly Gage: So I think it’s not quite that fighting for democracy abroad represses democracy at home, but it is a moment for people to really have a pretty significant struggle and pretty significant debate about what it’s going to mean to be involved in the world this way, and what it’s consequences at home will be.

Brian Balogh: Beverly Gage is a professor of history at Yale University. She’s the author of the book, The Day Wall Street Exploded: A Story of America in it’s First Age of Terror.

Reshaping a Broken World

Historian Erez Manela tells Brian about President Woodrow Wilson’s attempts to help build a new Europe, and how his philosophy has shaped U.S. foreign policy for nearly a century.

League of Nations; Woodrow Wilson; World War I; foreign policy

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Nathan Connolly: To avoid the carnage of another world war, Woodrow Wilson tried to craft a bold new system of global diplomacy.

Brian Balogh: In 2014 I spoke to Harvard historian, Erez Manela about what Wilson envisioned for his League of Nations, and why it ultimately didn’t last.

Erez Manela: Wilson sees the war as evidence that the balance of power arrangement has failed spectacularly and cannot be resuscitated, that cannot in his view be a new order that is again based on balance of power. So then the question becomes for him, what is the alternative to balance of power, and the alternative that he comes up with is what we’ve come to call, I suppose, the League of Nations. And I think that Wilson has in mind a fairly straightforward parallel between the League of Nations as he sees it and the US Constitution as it was formed in the late 18th century. Because keep in mind that, and Wilson knows this well, at the time of the Constitutional Convention the several states that the Constitution was going to bring together were sovereign international entities.

Brian Balogh: Describe Wilson’s vision of collective security through the League of Nations when he first imagined it, and tell me how that changed as a result of his war experience.

Erez Manela: Well, the issue that is often focused on when we think about collective security and the point that received the most critique in the debate in 1919 and after is the military commitment, that is, the sense that the collective security arrangements committed the United States to military involvement in Europe or elsewhere, wherever conflict was going to break out. And actually Wilson was very, very clear and he stated this numerous times explicitly, that the military intervention was going to be the very last resort, only if everything else has failed. And everything else meant two things that were to come before military intervention. One was what he called world opinion. His sense that once you get countries agreeing to be members, to join up, you will get countries and leaders starting to feel that they’re compelled, they have an interest in a sense.

Erez Manela: Now, if that wasn’t going to work, if some country was going to take aggressive action despite these kinds of shared understandings, then the next stage was going to be economic sanctions. But here, this was going to be a multilateral process, so this is the innovation. Innovation is that it wasn’t simply going to be one belligerent was going to put the other belligerent under blockade, it was going to be that the world community in a sense was going to agree through the league of nations to put an aggressive nation under economic sanction. So that was going to be the next stage, and he was very clear that that was an important stage.

Brian Balogh: So buy in from the international community was one of the real key innovations that Wilson was pursuing.

Erez Manela: Absolutely. And I think, I mean look. International organizations had been in place for a while, and obviously the clearest precedent here is the Concert of Europe that was put in place after the Napoleonic wars, after 1815. But for Wilson actually, it wasn’t a very good precedent because the Concert only took into account the views of the great powers. And Wilson actually strongly believed in this concept of the equality of nations, that the small nations as they were called at the time had to be involved in this, and in fact he perceived in a sense, the small nations operating as a kind of break on the ambitions of the great powers.

Brian Balogh: How did the League of Nations that actually emerged out of the Treaty of Versailles, how did that differ from Wilson’s original conception?

Erez Manela: Well that’s actually a really important question, because one thing that’s often missed in the history is that the League of Nations Covenant that emerged out of Versailles was a very different creature from what Wilson had envisioned. I think the best example of this is through the evolution of what’s known as Article 10 that guaranteed the security and territorial integrity of the nations’ members of the League and committed the other members to intervening in various ways, because what Wilson said in that draft was, he started off by saying, “Yes, the League guarantees the security and territorial integrity of the member states,” but then there was a very important and extended except, and he said, “Except in such circumstances,” and I’m paraphrasing, “Except in such circumstances where changes in racial conditions and economic conditions and the desires of the peoples concerned will necessitate changes in borders pursuant to the principle of self determination,” and he said that in such cases the League of Nations could be a 75% or three quarters majority could actually affect the redrawing of borders, of international borders. So he actually wanted to build into the League a mechanism for what can only be described as, I suppose a form of world government.

Brian Balogh: Right. This is really pretty radical stuff.

Erez Manela: It is! It is quite radical stuff. Now, I want to emphasize, Wilson did not come by this radical idea easily, he came by it because by the end of the war he was convinced that the old order was so broken and so dangerous that something radical had to be done to put together an international system that would work.

Brian Balogh: It wasn’t exactly what Wilson envisioned, but we do get a League of Nations sans the United States. Did it accomplish what Wilson thought it would?

Erez Manela: Well obviously it didn’t, it didn’t even come close. First of all, the League Covenant that emerges from the negotiations in Versailles is quite different from what Wilson had in mind initially, it’s to his mind a watered down version. He still defends it, he still wants the United States to join it, and that’s because he has an evolutionary view of such institutions. He thinks as long as we can put in place something, even something very imperfect, we have a chance of it evolving in the right direction over time. Then the other problem is that the United States Senate rejects the Treaty of Versailles and the League Covenant that was attached to it, and so the United States in fact never joins the League of Nations.

Brian Balogh: How much did Wilson’s vision shape American foreign policy in the century that has followed?

Erez Manela: Oh, I think it’s shaped American foreign policy and American posture in the world to a very great degree. If we look at Franklin Roosevelt, I see Roosevelt as a convinced Wilsonian who believes in the second World War, that Wilson had it right in terms of the general principles, but bungled the implementation because he was a less than perfect politician. And Roosevelt, I think, sets out to implement the Wilsonian vision, if you will, but to do it right. So he reconstitutes the League of Nations as the United Nations, and that system that Wilson put in place is not only not discarded, it’s in fact bolstered and developed into the United Nations system that we have today, and the United Nations Security Counsel, the General Assembly, and all of the various other organizations like UNESCO, like the World Health Organization, so on and so forth, that in fact have a great deal of impact on the lives of people around the world. And so in that sense I think we have to find that Wilson was right. The system that he believed in has in fact evolved, even if it hasn’t fulfilled all the hopes that he and others have had for it.

Brian Balogh: Erez, thanks for making Wilsonianism safe for public radio. I really appreciate it.

Erez Manela: Thanks for having me. It was a great pleasure.

Brian Balogh: Erez Manela is professor of history at Harvard University and author of the book, The Wilsonian Moment: Self Determination in the International Origins of Anti-Colonial Nationalism.

Nathan Connolly: That’s going to do it for us today, but you can keep the conversation going online. Let us know what you thought of the episode, or ask us your questions about history. You’ll find us at backstoryradio.org, or send an email to backstory@virginia.edu. We’re also on Facebook and Twitter at backstoryradio. Whatever you do, don’t be a stranger.

Brian Balogh: BackStory is produced at Virginia Humanities. Major support is provided by an anonymous donor, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Provost Office at the University of Virginia, the Joseph and Robert Cornell Memorial Foundation, and the Arthur Vining Davis Foundations. Additional support is founded by the Tomato Fund, cultivating fresh ideas in the arts, the humanities, and the environment. And special thanks to the Johns Hopkins Studios in Baltimore.

Nathan Connolly: Brian Balogh is professor of History at the University of Virginia. Ed Ayers is professor of the Humanities and President Emeritus of the University of Richmond. Joanne Freeman is professor of History and American Studies at Yale University. Nathan Connolly is the Herbert Baxter Adams Associate Professor of History at the Johns Hopkins University.

Nathan Connolly: BackStory was created by Andrew Wyndham for Virginia Humanities.